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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
EDWARD D. RE -
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE uniformity envisioned by the draftsmen of the original
Negotiable Instruments Law over half a century ago, has,
to a large extent, vanished from the American legal scene.
Indeed, its passing began even before it had reached ma-
turity, for the Law, itself, was never adopted in identical
form in all the states. Furthermore, such of its substance,
as was uniformly accepted, has been subject to more than
fifty years of amendment, modification, and divergent inter-
pretation in the various jurisdictions.1
In addition, it has become increasingly obvious that the
statute, as originally drafted and presently in force, contains
certain basic defects which render substantial revision both
necessary and desirable. 2 The proposed Commercial Code,
in the article on "Commercial Paper," is designed to achieve
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
'An example is the construction placed on Section 62 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. See Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co. v.
Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P. 2d 781 (1931) ; National City Bank of Chi-
cago v. National Bank, etc., 300 Ill. 103, 132 N. E. 832 (1921) ; National Re-
serve Bank v. Corn Exchange Bank, 177 App. Div. 195, 157 N. Y. Supp. 316
(1st Dep't 1916). On the varying methods of interpretation of the Negotiable
Instruments Law and for many "erroneous decisions due to failure to cite the
Act," see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABI INsTRuxENTs LAW 80 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel,
1948).
2 A good example is Section 36 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law which deals with "restrictive" indorsements. See Ames, The Negotiable
Instruments Law, 14 HARv. L. REy. 241 (1900); Brewster, Defense of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L. J. 84 (1901) ; Ames, The Negotiable
Itstruments Law, A Word More, 14 HARV. L. Rav. 442, 446 (1901) ; Brewster,
The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Rejoinder to Dean Ames, 15 HARv. L.
Rav. 26, 33 (1901). On "Contradictory Sections" and "Gaps in the Act," see
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRtfUENTs LAW 97 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
See also Atlantic City Nat. Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co., 107 N. J. L.
492, 155 Atl. 762 (1931) ; First Nat. Bank v. Morrell & Co., 53 S. D. 496, 221
N. W. 95 (1928); Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175
N. W. 93 (1919).
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the uniformity once envisioned and, in addition, to cure the
defects now extant in the present law of negotiable instru-
ments.
II. ScoPE OF CODE ARTICLE THREE
Article Three of the Code, entitled "Commercial Paper,"
is to all intents and purposes a complete revision of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. From the outset, however, it
should be noted that, like the N.I.L., it does not purport to
encompass every commercial transaction involving an el-
ement of negotiability. For example, it does not deal with
investment paper or investment securities such as bearer or
registered bonds. Nor does it embrace the regulation of
warehouse receipts, bills of lading, and other documents of
title. Many of these latter transactions are dealt with else-
where in the Code,3 but there has been a total deletion of
some existing provisions relating to commercial paper. Thus,
the Code eliminates the sections of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law dealing with acceptance for honor and
payment for honor which, over a period of years, have become
obsolete. 4
Uncertainty as to the proper location of provisions deal-
ing with bank collections can be discerned from an examina-
tion of the several decisions made by Code draftsmen in re-
lation to these sections. Whereas the May, 1949, draft of
the Uniform Commercial Code had included bank collections
in the article on "Commercial Paper," the 1950 draft rele-
gated such provisions to a different article of the Code
(Article Four). The 1951 revision, except for some sections
to be reworded and inserted into Article Three, deleted the
Bank Collections parts of Article Four from the Code.5 The
3 Investment paper and investment securities are treated in Article Eight
of the Code. Warehouse receipts, bills of lading and other documents of title
are regulated by the provisions of Article Seven.
4 NEGOTIABLE INSTRumENTS LAw §§ 161-177; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW
§§ 280-289, 300-306.
5 This was pursuant to a resolution made at the May 1951 meeting. The
Foreword to the June 1951 revisions states that "[s]ince the meeting there has
been some pretty well considered opinion saying that Article 4 should not have
been so completely deleted but should have been cut down to take out some
of the detail. It may well be that we shall hear more about Article 4." See
June 1951 Revision, Page 3.
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resolution, pursuant to which Article Four was eliminated,
contemplated that the omitted portions of the article would
be redrafted into a separate act. This separate act is to be
in such form that any state which adopts the Code can also
adopt this separate legislation as a supplement to the Code.
In view of what seems to be a rather uncertain future for
the provisions dealing with Bank Collections and Deposits,
this article, with a few exceptions, is limited to a treatment
of those provisions of Article Three which deal with the con-
ventional note, draft, check and certificate of deposit.
It should be noted, however, that Article Three cannot
properly be treated in vacuo; its provisions are part of an
overall codification which regards the commercial transac-
tion as a single subject of the law, notwithstanding the fact
that it may contain several distinct phases. Hence, the pro-
visions of the article on "Commercial Paper" must be ex-
amined in the light of certain other Code provisions which
express the general rules applicable to commercial trans-
actions. An interesting section, which should be read at the
outset, is the one dealing with the applicability of other
principles of law to commercial transactions. The section
provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.0
Although the listing given in the above section is merely
illustrative and not exhaustive, and hence the express refer-
ence to some fields of law is not intended to suggest the
negation of the general application of other fields of law, the
section is surely more explicit and comprehensive than the
comparable provision in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. The latter merely states that, "[i]n any case not
provided for in this chapter the rules of the law merchant
shall govern."'' 7 The Code provision clearly urges the con-
tinued application to commercial contracts of all of the sup-
6 UNIFORu COmmERCAL CODE § 1-103 (Spring 1951).
7 NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENsT LAW § 196; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 7.
[ VOL. 26
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plemental bodies of law except insofar as they are expressly
displaced by the Code. Thus, subject to commercial stand-
ards, the Uniform Commercial Code introduces equitable
principles into the law governing commercial transactions.
III. NATURE OF THE "ORDER" IN A DRAFT AND THE
"PROMISE" IN A NOTE
The Negotiable Instruments Law codified the law mer-
chant to the effect that an instrument to be negotiable must
contain either a "promise" or an "order." 8 In several cases,
the question has arisen whether the language used consti-
tuted an "order" or "promise" sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement of negotiability. Under the existing law, even
though the words, "order" or "promise," are not expressly
used in an instrument, if the language used is such as rea-
sonably to permit the implication of an "order" or "promise,"
the instrument is generally deemed to meet the statutory
requirement. 9 Under this relaxed policy of construction,
some courts have held an "I.O.U." to be a negotiable promis-
sory note.10 One writer " would resolve the question of ne-
gotiability by an inference as to the intention of the debtor.
He states: "If a debtor give a mere due-bill to his creditor
containing nothing but an acknowledgment of the debt, it is
fair to presume that he merely designed to furnish him with
evidence of its existence." 12 Although the law implies a
promise to pay from the existence of the debt, this promise
implied in law is insufficient to convert the due-bill into a
8 NFOTIABLF INSTRUMENTS LAW § 1; N. Y. NFG. INST. LAW § 20.
9 Shemonia v. Verda, 24 Ohio App. 246, 157 N. E. 717 (1927) ; Barker v.
Seamen, 61 N. Y. 648 (1875).
10 The conflict of authority concerning the negotiability of an I.O.U. or a
due bill also existed prior to the enactment of the English Bills of Exchange
Act of 1882 and the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in the United States.
It was, however, settled in England that an I.O.U. or due bill was not a nego-
tiable promissory note. Fisher v. Leslie, 1 Esp. 425 (1795) ("I.O.U. eight
guineas" was held not to be a promissory note and therefore required no stamp
under the English stamp acts.); Israel v. Israel, 1 Camp. 499, 170 Eng. Rep.
1035 (1808) ("I owe my father 470."). Although this view was also shared
by the majority of American Courts, there are decisions to the contrary.
Fleming v. Burge, 6 Ala. 373 (1944); Cummings v. Freeman, 2 Humph. 143
(Tenn. 1840).
" 1 DANIEL, NEGTBLE I1STRUMENTS § 37 (1891).
12 Ibid.
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promissory note, since the promise required for the existence
of a promissory note should be expressed or necessarily im-
plied from the words used in the instrument itself.'3
Notwithstanding the statement in Shimel v. Williams '4
to the effect that four prior New York decisions 15 had estab-
lished the rule that in New York an "I.O.U." was not nego-
tiable, no such certainty existed on the point. Although the
court in the Shimel case uttered the dictum that "[t]his
instrument, not made payable to bearer or order, is not a
negotiable promissory note for which in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, a consideration would be presumed," 16
it nevertheless held that an "I.O.U." was an acknowledgment
of debt sufficient to import a consideration.
The Uniform -Commercial Code resolves these conflicts
by its definition of "order" and "promise." It provides that
"[a]n 'order' is a direction to pay and must be more than an
authorization or request . . . ," 17 and "[a] 'promise' is an
undertaking to pay and must be more than an acknowledg-
ment of an obligation." 18 The Code definitions intend to
make it clear that neither the "I.O.U." nor the other examples
cited are to be deemed negotiable instruments within the
Commercial Code.
In this connection it is interesting to note that the Code
has omitted the section of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which provides that "[t]he instrument need not follow the
language of this act, but any terms are sufficient which
clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements
13 Although in varying language, this thought has been expressed by all of
the authors on Negotiable Instruments. STORY, PROMISSORY NoTEs § 14 (1845);
1 DANIE.L, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS §§ 36, 37 (1891); BRITTON, BILLS AND
NOTES § 10 (1943).
14 136 Misc. 464, 240 N. Y. Supp. 161 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
15 Hegeman v. Moon, 131 N. Y. 462, 30 N. E. 487 (1892); Sheldon v.
Heaton, 88 Hun 535, 34 N. Y. Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1895); Kimball v. Hunt-
ington, 10 Wend. 675 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1833); Russell v. Whipple, 2 Cow. 536
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). The cited cases are in fact persuasive authority for
the contrary proposition. See also Luqueer v. Prosser, 1 Hill. 256 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1841), wherein the court citing Kimball v. Huntington, supra, said
.... a common due bill is a note."
16 Shimel v. Williams, 136 Misc. 464, 465, 240 N. Y. Supp. 161, 162 (Sup.
Ct. 1930).
17 UrMoRM COMMERCAL CODE § 3-102(1) (b) (Spring 1951).
28 Id. § 3-102 (1) (c).
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hereof." 19 The draftsmen justify this omission by stating
that the provision served no useful purpose, encouraged bad
drafting and caused courts to hold questionable paper to be
negotiable. Actually, the omission does not mean that an
instrument must followo the language of the section that de-
fines a draft, check, certificate of deposit, and note.20  One
term may still be deemed the equivalent of another as in the
case of "I undertake" instead of "I promise," or "Pay to
holder," instead of "Pay to bearer." However, the omission
to re-enact the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law
does mean that if neither the language of the new definition,
nor a "clear equivalent," is found, the case becomes doubtful
and ". . . in doubtful cases the decision should be against
negotiability." 21
IV. FORm OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Section 3-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code estab-
lishes the requisites of negotiability as follows:
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article
must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or power
given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article;
and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this
section is
(a) a "draft" ("bill of exchange") if it is an order;
(b) a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on
demand;
1 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 10; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 29. See
BrroN, BILLS AND NoTs § 35 (1943).2 0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104(2) (a), (b), (c), (d) (Spring 1951).
2 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104, Comment 6 (Spring 1950). Cf.
1 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS § 106 (1891).
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(c) a "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgment by a
bank of receipt of money with an engagement to repay, it;
(d)- a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
The now classical definition that a negotiable instrument
is a "'courier without luggage,' whose countenance is its
passport" 22 (i.e., must express all of its terms on its face), is
equally descriptive under the Code. It is clear that an in-
strument to be negotiable within the meaning of the Code
must comply with all the requirements established by Section
3-104. Furthermore, the intention of the draftsmen is now
clear that a writing does not become negotiable by the inser-
tion of a clause agreeing that it shall be one.23  Although
Section 3-112 permits the insertion of certain obligations and
powers in addition to the simple promise or order to pay
money, subdivision 1(b) of Section 3-104 declares that the
instrument cannot carry any others. 24
Under existing law, the negotiable character of an in-
strument is not affected by a provision which "1... authorizes
the sale of collateral securities in case the instrument be not
paid at maturity... ., 25 The Code does not limit the power
of sale to a case of default at maturity. The -Code language
states simply that the negotiability of an instrument is not
affected by a statement that "... in case of default on the
instrument the collateral may be sold. . . . 20 Hence, the
Code permits a clause which authorizes the sale of collateral
upon any default in the instrument, and this is intended to
include a default in the payment of any installment as well
as a default in the payment of interest.27
22 1 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS § 303 (1891); Heaton v. Meyers,
34 Colo. 59, 62 (1878).
23ser... a contract. . .does not become a negotiable instrument by the mere
insertion of a clause agreeing that it shall be one." UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL
CODE § 3-104, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104, Comment 4 (Spring 1950). Ex-
amples of provisions that would destroy negotiability would be: an under-
taking to insure mortgaged property, or an authority to sell any property not
given as security for the instrument.2 5 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 5(2); N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 24(1).
Farmers & Merchants' Bank v. Davies, 144 La. 532, 80 So. 713 (1919) ; First
Nat. Bank of Philadelphia v. Stoneley, 111 N. J. L. 519, 168 Atl. 602 (1933).26 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-112(1) (b) (Spring 1951).
27 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-112, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
[ VOL. 26
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Under the Negotiable Instruments Law questions have
arisen concerning the negotiability of instruments which
contain a clause requiring that the obligor furnish additional
collateral to absorb a depreciation in value of the collateral
originally pledged. Although some courts have held that
such a clause does not destroy the negotiability of the in-
strument,28 those courts have found difficulty in reconciling
the holdings with the provision that "fa]n instrument which
contains an order or promise to do any act in addition to the
payment of money is not negotiable." 29 The New York
Court of Appeals has explained that such a clause does not
involve a promise to do an act "in addition to the payment of
money," but rather is simply a promise to do something in aid
of, and incidental to, the payment of money.30 The Code re-
solves the conflict in authority in favor of the view taken by
the New York Court, and renders unnecessary any further
struggle with semantics by providing expressly that the
negotiability of an instrument is not affected by a "promise
to give additional collateral on demand." 31
A. When Promise or Order is Unconditional
The Code provisions make it clear that the conditional
or unconditional character of the promise or order is to be
determined by what is expressed in the instrument itself.32
This rejects those decisions 33 which have held that an in-
strument which recites that it was issued for an executory
promise gives rise to implied conditions which destroy nego-
28rFinley v. Smith, 165 Ky. 445, 177 S. W. 262 (1915); City Nat. Bank v.
Roberts, 266 Mass. 239, 165 N. E. 470 (1929) ; Sommers v. Goulden, 147 Okla.
51, 294 Pac. 175 (1930). Contra: Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan.
71, 116 Pac. 239 (1911) ; Nussear v. Hazard, 148 Md. 345, 129 AtI. 506 (1925).
The author of BRANiA-N, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW submits that the
cases which hold such a note to be negotiable are in "... . direct conflict with
the plain meaning of this section." (NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 5.)2 9 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 6; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 24 (first
sentence).3o First Nat. Bank of Bridgeport v. Blackman, 249 N. Y. 322, 164 N. E.
113 (1928), reargunent denied, 250 N. Y. 537, 166 N. E. 315 (1929). See also
BIGELOW, THE LAW OF BuL, NoTrs AND CHECKS § 143 (3d ed. 1928).
31 UNnwoRm CommERcIAL CODE § 3-112(1) (c) (Spring 1951).
32 Id. § 5-105.
33 Sacred Heart Church Building Committee v. Manson, 203 Ala. 256, 82 So.
498 (1919) ; Robbins v. Life Ins. Co., 169 Tenn. 507, 89 S. W. 2d 340 (1936).
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tiability. Of course, the Code retains the rule that if an in-
strument contains language subjecting payment to the terms
of another agreement the promise to pay is not uncondi-
tional.34 The distinction, which must be made, is between a
reference to a separate agreement, and language which re-
quires the holder to look to the separate instrument for the
terms of payment. Under the Code, an instrument is not
negotiable unless the holder can know all of its terms from
the instrument itself.3 5
On the other hand, an otherwise unconditional promise
or order is not made conditional by the fact that the instru-
ment "1... is subject to implied or constructive conditions." 36
This latter provision would seem to resolve the doubt con-
cerning the negotiability of rent notes even in those states
which have a statute similar to Section 227 of the New York
Real Property Law, which permits a tenant to surrender the
premises and relieves him from liability for future rent in
the event that the premises become unfit for occupancy.
Furthermore, in the absence of express language to the con-
trary, under the Code, the negotiability of the rent note is
not destroyed by the fact that it states that it is given in
payment for future rent. In this respect the Code adopts
the sound policy that the negotiability of an instrument is
not affected by "implied or constructive conditions," and
overturns cases such as Robbins v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia,3
where the court stated that "... there can be no doubt that
this contract, although a promise to pay in form otherwise
negotiable, is rendered conditional by the statute." 38
In relation to recitals such as "[t]his note is given in
payment for the purchase of goods as per contract of this
date," the Code 39 continues the existing construction placed
34UNIo M COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105(2) (a) (Spring 1951).
35 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105, Comment (Spring 1950). See Wil-
liamson v. Craig, 204 Iowa 555, 215 N. W. 664 (1927) ; Hubbard v. Wallace
Co., 201 Iowa 1143, 208 N. W. 730 (1926); Fayetteville Building and Loan
Ass'n v. Crouch, 115 W. Va. 651, 177 S. E. 532 (1934).
36UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105 (2) (a) (Spring 1951).
37 Robbins v. Life Ins. Co., 169 Tenn. 507, 89 S. W. 2d 340 (1936).
38 Id. at 341. See WHITNEY, BILLS AND NOTES 26 (1948). "Since thou-
sands of rent notes are in circulation in reliance on their being negotiable, it
would seem that only a condition expressed on the face of the instrument
should prevent their being negotiable."3 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105 (Spring 1951). "A promise or order
[ VOL. 26
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upon the Negotiable Instruments Law that such recitals are
merely statements as to the origin of the instrument and do
not affect negotiability.40 Such references are merely infor-
mational in nature and do not condition payment according
to the terms of the agreement to which it refers.
B. Instrument Issued by Unincorporated Association
A conflict has existed concerning the negotiability of in-
struments issued by unincorporated associations, when pay-
ment is expressly limited to the assets of the association, and
liability of the individual members is excluded. The same
problem is presented when an instrument, issued by a trust
estate, excludes the personal liability of the trustee.41 Under
the Code, both of the above types of instruments would be
treated as negotiable, as would similar instruments issued by
partnerships and estates.42  The Code goes further, and de-
clares negotiable, instruments which limit payment to a par-
ticular fund or to proceeds from a particular source "... if
the instrument is issued by a government or governmental
agency or unit. . . ., 14
0. Certainty as to Sum
The section of the Code dealing with certainty as to sum
clarifies doubts that arose under the Negotiable Instruments
Law 44 as to interest, discounts or additions, exchange, costs
and attorneys' fees, and matters of acceleration or extension.
The change effected by the Code is to reject those decisions
which have denied negotiability to instruments providing for
otherwise unconditional is not made conditional by the fact that the instrument
• . . (b) states its consideration, whether performed or promised, or the trans-
action which gave rise to the instrument, or that the promise or order is made
or the instrument matures in accordance with or 'as per' such transaction; or
(c) refers to or states that it arises out of a separate agreement. ...
40NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 3(2); N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 22(2).
41 Compare Baker v. James, 280 Mass. 43, 181 N. E. 861 (1932) ; Hibbs v.
Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907) (held negotiable), with Lorimer
v. McGreevy, 229 Mo. App. 970, 84 S. W. 2d 667 (1935) (held negotiable).
42 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105(1) (h) (Spring 1951); UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §3-105, Comment 7 (Spring 1950).
43 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105(1) (g) (Spring 1951).44 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 2; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 21.
1951]
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a discount of the principal in the event of a payment prior
to the ultimate date of maturity.45 The basis for such deci-
sions was the assumption that the provision for a discount
rendered the sum payable uncertain. The Code categorically
declares that the sum payable is a sum certain even though
it is to be paid 11... with a stated discount or addition if paid
before or after the date fixed for payment." 46 Under the
Code, there would be no difference of treatment between a
clause which increases the interest rate upon default or de-
creases the interest rate if the instrument is paid at ma-
turity 4 7 and one which provides for a discount of the prin-
cipal sum. In all cases it is sufficient that at the time of
payment, from the instrument itself, with the necessary
arithmetic computation, the holder is able to determine the
amount payable on the instrument. 4
D. Instrument must be Payable in Money
Although there has never been any question concerning
the negotiability of an instrument payable in the circulating
medium of exchange which is legal tender at the place of
payment, there has existed a conflict of authority concerning
instruments calling for the payment of foreign money such
as francs, lira, pounds, or other recognized currency of a
foreign government.49 In view of the uncertainty of the law
in New York on this question, one author has remarked:
"... strange to say, in a world financial center such as New
45 See Watehouse v. Choulnard, 128 Me. 505, 149 At. 21 (1930) ; Frolick
v. Norton, 2 Mich. 130 (1851); First National Bank v. Watson, 56 Okla. 495,
155 Pac. 1152 (1916) ; Farmers' Loan Trust Co. v. McCoy & Spivey Bros., 32
Okla. 277, 122 Pac. 125 (1912); National Bank of Commerce v. Feeney, 12
S. D. 156, 80 N. W. 186 (1899). See also Notes, 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 385
(1948), 39 YALE L. J. 1205 (1930).
46 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-106(1) (C) (Spring 1951).
47 See Hutson v. Rankin, 36 Idaho 169, 213 Pac. 345 (1922) ; Farm Mort-
gage and Loan Co. v. Martin, 51 S. D. 424, 214 N. W. 816 (1927).
4s UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-106 (Spring 1951); UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 3-106, Comment (Spring 1950).
49 Compare Incitti v. Ferrante, 12 N. J. Misc. 840, 175 At. 908 (1933);
Hebblethwaithe v. Flint, 185 App. Div. 249, 173 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't
1918) (held negotiable), with Levy v. Cleveland Ry., 210 App. Div. 422, 206
N. Y. Supp. 261 (1st Dep't 1924) ; Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71 (N. Y.
1840) (held non-negotiable). See cases discussed in BRiTroN, BILLS AND NoTES
126 et seq. (1943).
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York, the law is not definitely settled on this momentous
point." 50 In recognition of the international nature of the
laws of commerce and of the needs of international trade,
the Code provides that an instrument calling for payment of
a stated sum in a foreign currency is payable in a "sum cer-
tain in money," and, "... unless a different medium of pay-
ment is specified in the instrument, may be satisfied in pay-
ment of that number of dollars which the stated foreign
currency will purchase at the buying sight rate for that
currency on the day of demand." 51 If the instrument speci-
fies a definite foreign currency as the medium of payment, the
instrument is negotiable and "is payable in that currency." 52
While the Code rejects the view that "money" is limited
to legal tender, it also rejects the contention that "money"
would include any medium of exchange that is current or
acceptable in the particular community, such as "gold dust,
beaver pelts, or cigarettes in occupied Germany." 53 The
test prescribed is that of governmental sanction which recog-
nizes the circulating medium as a part of the official currency
of the government. The Code provides: "An instrument is
payable in money if the medium of exchange in which it is
payable is money at the time the instrument is made." 11 To
avoid subjecting the Code to any unnecessary judicial con-
struction it adds that an instrument payable in "currency"
or "current funds" is payable in money.55
E. Instrument must be Payable at a Definite Time
1. Instrument payable after death. The change of
policy effected by the Code in relation to the requirement of
50 NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 346
(1950).
51 UNIFORM Coam=caL CODE § 3-107(2) (Spring 1951). It is to be no-
ticed that the Code establishes the "day of demand' rule of conversion from
the foreign currency to dollars. On the discharge of foreign currency debts
in local money and the various rules regarding the time of conversion, see
NussBAum, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 360 et seq.
(1950).52 UNIFoRM CommERcIAL CODE § 3-107(2) (Spring 1951).53 UNIFORM CommERC iA. CODE § 3-107 (Spring 1951). See Oliphant, The
Theory of Money in the Law of Commercial Instriments, 29 YALE L. J. 609
(1920).
54UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE § 3-107(1) (Spring 1951).
55 Ibid.
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certainty as to time of payment is evidenced by the sub-
stitution of the words "definite time" 56 for the "fixed, or
determinable future time" terminology of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.5 7 Excepting an instrument payable on
demand,58 under the Code the time of payment is definite
only if it can be determined from the face of the instrument.
This changes the law concerning instruments payable after
events certain to happen although the time of happening be
uncertain.5 9  Hence, an instrument payable a fixed period
of time after the death of the maker or of some other person
will no longer be negotiable under the Code.60
2. Effect of acceleration clauses. Existing doubts con-
cerning the effect of certain acceleration clauses upon the
certainty of time of payment of an otherwise negotiable in-
strument would be removed by the Code. The pertinent
section provides that an instrument is payable at a definite
time if by its terms it is payable at a definite time subject
to any acceleration.61  This provision eliminates the distinc-
tion formerly made between acceleration provisions condi-
tioned upon the happening of an event which is either within
the control of the maker or not within the control of the
parties, and those giving the holder an unrestricted power to
accelerate.6 2  At common law, and by majority rule under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, if the clause was construed
to give the holder the option to accelerate at his "whim or
caprice," the instrument was generally held to be non-
negotiable.6 3 While the New York courts have been in agree-
56 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109 (Spring 1951).
57 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 1, 4; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW §§ 20, 23.
58 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-108 (Spring 1951). "Instruments payable
on demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and those in which
no time for payment is stated."
59 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 4(3); N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 23(3).
60 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109(2) (Spring 1951). Instruments pay-
able at or after death, if otherwise negotiable, have almost universally been
held to be negotiable. Murrell v. Gibbs' Adm'r, 275 Ky. 124, 120 S. W. 2d
1018 (1938); Keeler v. Hiles' Estate, 103 Neb. 465, 172 N. W. 363 (1919);
nut cf. Kerr v. Smith, 156 App. Div. 807, 142 N. Y. Supp. 57 (1st Dep't 1913).
61 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109(1) Cc) (Spring 1951).
62 For excellent discussion, see Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time
Paper, 32 HARv. L. REv. 747 (1919); Aigler, Time Certainty in Negotiable
Paper, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 313 (1929).
63 Murrell v. Exchange Bank, 168 Ark. 645, 271 S. W. 21 (1925) ; American
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ment with the majority of states that an acceleration clause
contingent upon a non-payment of installments, the death of
the maker, or any other objectively ascertainable event, does
not destroy the negotiability of an instrument, 64 they have
not agreed that an acceleration clause that is subjective with
the holder destroys negotiability. Since the New York courts
have not drawn the "distinction between the objective and
subjective tests of acceleration," 6r in New York a clause
whereby a holder could accelerate the date of maturity "if he
deems himself insecure" would not destroy negotiability."
Although it may at first appear that the Code adopts the
New York view by providing that an instrument is payable
at a definite time if by its terms it is payable "at a definite
time subject to any acceleration," 67 a reading of Section
1-208 of the Code indicates that the power of the holder to
accelerate payment is limited by what may come to be termed
a "good faith" standard. The section provides:
A term providing that one party may accelerate payment or per-
formance or require collateral or additional collateral not on stated
contingencies but "at will" or "when he deems himself insecure" or
Finance Corp. v. Bourne, 190 Okla. 332, 123 P. 2d 671 (1942); First State
Bank of Cheyenne v. Barton, 129 Okla. 67, 263 Pac. 142 (1928); accord,
Kimpton v. Studebaker Bros. Co., 14 Idaho 552, 94 Pac. 1039 (1908). Prior
to the Negotiable Instruments Law it was held in Massachusetts that an in-
strument payable "on demand or in three years" was non-negotiable. Mahoney
v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass. 151 (1882).
64 Glide v. Sheridan, 173 Misc. 542, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1939),
aff'd, 284 N. Y. 628, 29 N. E. 2d 937 (1940).
65 WHiTNE, BILLS ANDNoTES 39 (1948).
66 Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Marsh, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (1940). In the Marsh
case the note contained several accelerating events and also provided ". . . or
if there be such a change in the condition or affairs (financial or otherwise) of
any of the undersigned as in the opinion of the holder thereof will increase its
risk, this note shall, at the option of its holder, become immediately due and
payable, without demand or notice. . . ." The court said, "I am unable to
agree with the defendants' contention that the note is not negotiable .... As
I view it, there is no logical basis for distinguishing between an acceleration
clause which becomes operative when the holder determines that the maker's
financial affairs increase the holder's risk and a clause which becomes operative
in the event of death, insolvency or bankruptcy of the maker .... To hold
that an instrument payable at a fixed time but accelerable at the option of the
holder destroys its negotiability seems to me to be directly contrary to the plain
meaning of Section 23. However construed, such an instrument is suitable for
circulation, more so than the ordinary note without an acceleration clause. The
value is certain and the danger of insolvency is to some extent overcome."
Id. at 285.
67 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109(1) (c) (Spring 1951) (emphasis
added).
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in words of similar import means that he has power to do so only in
the good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is
impaired but the burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the
party against whom the power is to be exercised.
Since the true reason why courts have refused to uphold
the negotiability of an instrument which gives the holder an
uncontrolled power of acceleration is the feeling that such
arbitrary power would give him an unfair advantage over
the maker, 68 the Code, rather than destroy the commercially
desirable clause, adopts an equitable and common sense
standard for the exercise of the power. The power to accel-
erate, however worded, under the Code is in fact controlled
for it can only be exercised "... in the good faith belief that
the prospect of payment or performance is impaired .... , 69
Although as a matter of evidence and procedure the burden
of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against
whom the power is to be exercised 70 (the maker), the Code
significantly provides that "1... 'good faith' means honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 71 The estab-
lishment of the requirement of good faith is the manner in
which the Code prevents a holder from accelerating payment
solely to oppress a debtor.
3. Eotension of time provisions. The existing confu-
sion in the decisions 72 arising out of extension clauses is
eliminated by the Code provision which declares that an in-
strument is payable at a definite time if, by its terms, it is
payable at a definite time ". .. subject to extension at the
option of the holder, or to extension to a further definite
time at the option of the maker or automatically upon or
after a specified act or event." '7 However, in order to pre-
vent a holder from refusing payment in an attempt to keep
68 See Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Comtercial
Code, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 255, 263 (1950).
69 UNIORM COmmEmCIAL CODE § 1-208 (Spring 1951).
70 Ibid.
72 Id. § 1-201 (19).
72 Quinn v. Bane, 18 Iowa 843, 164 N. W. 788 (1917) ; Security Nat. Bank
v. Gunderson, 52 S. D. 25, 216 N. W. 595 (1925) ; National Bank of Commerce
v. Kenny, 98 Tex. 293, 83 S. W. 368 (1904).
7
3 UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 3-109(d) (Spring 1951).
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interest running, the Code provides that "[n]otwithstanding
any term of the instrument, the holder may extend it only
with the consent of the maker at the time of the extension." 74
It also states that, unless otherwise specified, consent to ex-
tension authorizes a single extension for not longer than the
original period. 75
F. Words of- NegotiabViity
1. Substitutes for words "Order Of." Although it has
always been clear that an instrument could not be negotiable
without words of negotiability, problems have arisen when
the words used were words other than the usual "or order"
or "bearer." For example, when an instrument states that
it is "payable on return of this certificate properly indorsed,"
some courts have held that the instrument does contain
words of negotiability and hence is negotiable. 76 To a cer-
tain extent such decisions find support in the provision of
the Negotiable Instruments Law which states: "The instru-
ment need not follow the language of this act, but any terms
are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform
to the requirements thereof." 7 Not only has the Code elim-
inated this Negotiable Instruments Law provision, but Sec-
tion 3-110 expressly changes the result of the cases referred
to by providing that "[a]n instrument not payable to order
is not made so payable by such words as 'payable upon re-
turn of this instrument properly indorsed.'"
Regarding the negotiability of an instrument payable to
"Jones or assigns" or to the "assigns of Jones," the Code
resolves whatever conflict may have existed 78 in favor of the
74Id. § 3-118(f).
75 Ibid.76 Felton v. Commercial National Bank, 39 Ohio App. 24, 177 N. E. 52
(1930); Klauber v. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis. 551, 3 N. W. 357 (1879). Writing
before the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, Daniel states: "No
precise form of words is necessary to impart negotiability..... 'order' or
'bearer' are convenient and expressive but clearly not the only words which
will communicate the quality of negotiability." 1 DANIEL, NEGOTTABLE INSTRU-
MENTS § 106 (lst ed. 1891). Nelson v. Citizens' Bank, 191 App. Div. 19, 180
N. Y. Supp. 747 (lst Dep't 1920), aff'd, 232 N. Y. 581, 134 N. E. 580 (1922).
The Nelson case has been criticized in 20 CoL, L. Rav. 621 (1920).
77 NEGOTLABLE INSTRumENTS LAW § 10; N. Y. NEG. IxsT. LAW § 29.
78 Compare Zander v. N. Y. Security and Trust Co., 178 N. Y. 208, 211,
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negotiability of such instrument. It provides that "[a]n in-
strument is payable to order when by its terms it is payable
to the order or assigns of any person therein specified with
reasonable certainty, or to him or his order, or when it is
conspicuously designated on its face as 'exchange' or the like
and names a payee .... ,,79
2. Payable to "Bearer." Under the Code, an instru-
ment is payable to bearer when by its terms it is payable to:
(a) bearer or the order of bearer, or
(b) a specified person or bearer, or
(c) "cash" or the order of "cash," or any other indication which
does not purport to designate a specific payee.8 0
The above language indicates clearly that an instrument
payable "to the order of bearer" is bearer paper and not
order paper.8' It is also clear that under the Code if an in-
strument is payable "to the order of ," there being
no mark or other designation in the blank space, the instru-
ment is simply incomplete and is not bearer paper.8 2 The
problem presented in Gordon v. Lansing State Savings
Bank,8 3 however, remains unsolved. There the instrument
was payable "to the order of ." Since there ap-
peared a line through the blank space, the court held that
there was no implied authority to fill in, nor did the line
represent an impersonal payee. Although it is believed that
such an instrument is probably bearer paper under the Code,
such a conclusion can only be justified by holding that the
line through the blank space is "any other indication which
does not purport to designate a specific payee." 4
70 N. E. 449, 450 (1904), uith County of Wilson v. Nat. Bank, 103 U. S. 770,
776 (1880).
79 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-110(1) (Spring 1951).
so Id. §3-111.
81 Cf. American Nat. Bank v. Kerley, 109 Ore. 155, 220 Pac. 116 (1923).
82 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-115 (Spring 1951) (incomplete instru-
ments).
83 133 Mich. 143, 94 N. W. 741 (1903).
84 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-111(c) (Spring 1951).
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G. Effect of Promise to Do Something in Addition To or in
Lieu Of the Payment of Money
Section 3-112 of the Code states as follows:
(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not affected by
(a) the omission of a statement of any consideration or of the
place where the instrument is drawn or payable; or
(b) a statement that collateral has been given for the instrument
or in case of default on the instrument the collateral may be sold; or
(c) a promise to give additional collateral on demand; or
(d) a term authorizing a confession of judgment on the instru-
ment if it is not paid when due; or
(e) a term purporting to waive the benefit of any law intended
for the advantage or protection of any obligor; or
(f) a term in a draft providing that the payee by indorsing or
cashing it acknowledges full satisfaction of an obligation of the maker
or drawer.
Under present law, the negotiability of an otherwise
negotiable instrument is not affected by a provision which
gives the holder an election to require something to be done
in lieu of the payment of money.8 5 Under the Code, however,
such an instrument would not be negotiable. Since such a
provision has been of importance only in connection with
bonds and other investment securities, 8 the matter is prop-
erly covered in Article Eight of the Code.8 7
Subdivision (c) of Section 3-112, which permits a
"promise to give additional collateral on demand," goes be-
yond the reasoning of the New York case of First National
Bank of Bridgeport v. Blackman,88 and supports the inclu-
8 5 NEGTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 5; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 24 (nego-
tiability not affected by a provision which "Gives the holder an election to re-
quire something to be done in lieu of payment of money").8 6 E.g., Louisa Nat. Bank v. Paintsville Nat. Bank, 260 Ky. 327, 85 S. W.
2d 668 (1935); Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y. 114 (1860).
87 "An option to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money
is uncommon and not desirable in commercial paper." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-112, Comment (Spring 1950). See Cosway, Innwvations in Articles
Three and Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEIMP. PROB.
284, 286 (1951).88 249 N. Y. 322, 164 N. E. 113 (1928).
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sion in a note of a clause to give additional collateral "on
demand" without limiting the right to make demand to cases
where the collateral originally pledged depreciates in value.89
H. Incomplete, Undelivered Instruments
The existing law concerning incomplete instruments
may be stated briefly as follows: Where an instrument is
signed and is delivered with blanks, i.e., lacking in any essen-
tial terms, if subsequently completed and negotiated to a
holder in due course such instrument is "valid and effectual
for all purposes," 90 even if it had been previously completed
in excess of authority. Since there was an actual delivery
of the instrument, there exists in favor of the holder in due
course the conclusive presumption that it was filled in ac-
cording to authority.9 1 Similarly, if an instrument, com-
plete and regular on its face, is stolen prior to delivery, in
the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery is
"conclusively presumed." 92 Of course, in this latter situ-
ation, the holder in due course would recover against the
maker only if the paper was bearer paper, or, if order paper,
only if it had been actually indorsed by the payee. Except-
ing the case of a forgery 93 of a necessary indorsement, the
holder in due course recovers by virtue of the conclusive
presumption of delivery of the completed instrument.
Although none of the above is changed under the Code, 94
89 See Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, 32 HARv. L. REv.
747 (1919); Palmer, Negotiable Instrinnents Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 48 MicH. L. REv. 255, 259-261 (1950).
90 NFGABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 14; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 33.
91 See National Exchange Bank v. Lester, 194 N. Y. 461, 87 N. E. 779
(1909); Linick v. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N. Y. Supp. 93 (2d
Dep't 1910); Rutherford Nat. Bank v. Nichols, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 658 (Sup. Ct.
1951).92 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 16; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 35; Hibbs
v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E, 1108 (1907) ; Perlmutter v. R. & K. Leather
Goods, Inc., 54 N. Y. S. 2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Poess v. Twelfth Ward
Bank, 43 Misc. 45, 86 N. Y. Supp. 857 (Sup. Ct. 1904) ; Gresser v. Sugarman,
37 Misc. 799, 76 N. Y. Supp. 922 (Sup. Ct. 1902) ; cf. Holzman, Cohen and Co.
v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N. Y. Supp. 211 (1st Dep't 1916); Linick v.
Nutting, 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N. Y. Supp. 93 (2d Dep't 1910).93 NroTIALa INSTRUMENTS LAW § 23; N. Y. NaG. INST. LAW § 42.
94 UNIFORM ComMERcIAL CODE § 3-1 19 (Spring 1951) (incomplete instru-




the Code does effect an extremely important change in a third
situation, where the instrument is neither complete nor
delivered. Under the existing law, "[w]hen an incomplete
instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed
and negotiated without authority, be a valid contract in the
hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature
was placed thereon before delivery." 95 Therefore, although
either incompleteness or lack of delivery is a "personal" de-
fense not assertable against a holder in due course, the pres-
ence of both factors constitutes a "real" defense assertable
even against a holder in due course. This result is changed
by the Code, and the holder in due course is protected in all
three situations.90 The comments to the Code explain that,
since neither nondelivery nor unauthorized completion is a
defense against a holder in due course, ". .. it has always
been illogical that the two together should invalidate the
instrument in his hands." 97 It is stated that in each case
the holder in due course relies on the maker's signature, and
the loss, under the Code, is made to fall upon the party whose
conduct in signing blank paper has made the loss possible
- rather than upon the holder in due course. This result is
in harmony with the equitable principle that as between two
innocent parties the loss should fall upon the one who made
the loss possible.
Subdivision Two of Section 4-501 of Article Four on
Bank Deposits and Collections, which is scheduled for inclu-
sion in Article Three on Commercial Paper,98 parallels the
above provisions which protect a holder in due course and
extends the same protection to banks. It provides:
9 5 NEaoImnx INSTRUMENTs LAW § 15; N. Y. NEG. Ixsr. LAW § 34. See
cases cited note 92 supra; Vanable v. American Express Co., 217 N. C. 548,
8 S. E. 2d 804 (1940); Heimberg v. Lincoln Nat. Bank, 113 N. J. L. 76, 172
Atl. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Pavilis v. Farmers Union Livestock Commission,
68 S. D. 96, 298 N. W. 732 (1941) ; City Nat. Bank v. American Express Co.,
16 S. W. 2d 278 (Tex. 1929).
96 "If the completion is unauthorized the rules as to material alteration apply
(Section 3-407), even thoWuh the paper reas not delivered by the inaker or
drawer. . . ." (emphasis supplied). UNIFORM CoMMERC AI CODE §3-115(2)
(Spring 1951). "A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instru-
ment has been completed, he may enforce it as completed." Id. § 3-407(3).9 7 UNIFORM COmMERCIAL CODE § 3-116, Comment 5 (Spring 1950).
9s See June 1951 Revision, Page 7.
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A bank which in good faith makes payment to a holder may
charge the indicated account of its customer according to
(a) the original tenor of his altered item; or
(b) the tenor of his completed item, even though the bank knew
it was incomplete when delivered.
There is dicta in New York to the effect that if the
drawer of a check signed in blank were to sue the drawee
bank for restitution, in a case where the check had been
stolen and completed, the drawer would not recover since the
loss was presumably caused by the depositor's failure to ex-
ercise due care; 99 such dicta is clearly in accord with the
policy of the Code which affords the depositary bank maxi-
mum protection.
V. TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION
A. Transfer of Instrument; Reacquisition
Section 3-201 of the Code, dealing with transfer and
right to indorsement, brings together widely scattered pro-
visions of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It contains
three provisions:
(1) Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights
as the transferor has therein, except that a transferee who has him-
self been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument
or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim against it
cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due
course.
(2) A transfer of a security interest in an instrument vests the
foregoing rights in the transferee to the extent of the interest
transferred.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of an in-
strument not then payable to bearer gives the transferee the specifi-
cally enforceable right to have the unqualified indorsement of the
transferor. Negotiation takes effect only when the indorsement is
made and until that time there is no presumption that the transferee
is the owner.
99 See Holzman, Cohen and Co. v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N. Y.
Supp. 211 (1st Dep't 1916); Trust Co. of America v. Conklin, 65 Misc. 1,
119 N. Y. Supp. 367 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
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Pursuant to the above section, any person who transfers
an instrument, whether or not a "holder," 100 transfers what-
ever rights he had therein, and such rights are acquired by
the transferee even though they do not amount to the legally
protected interest called "title." Furthermore, the transfer
of rights, to be effective, is not limited to transfers for value
but would include an ordinary gift of the instrument.
The manifest clarity of the section can leave no doubt
that, whereas value is not required to confer upon the trans-
feree the "rights" of the transferor, value is required if the
transferee is to possess the specifically enforceable power to
have the unqualified indorsement of the transferor. By elim-
inating the ambiguity of the existing statute concerning the
requirement for "value," courts can no longer reach the
aberrational result whereby the transferee of a negotiable
instrument was not accorded the rudimentary rights pos-
sessed by any assignee of an assignable chose in action.1 1
The derivative taker provision of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law,'0 2 which assured a holder of negotiable paper a
free market for the paper, is, under the Code, only one phase
of a broader policy which would enable anyone to transfer
whatever rights he may have.
Concerning the rights and status of a reacquirer, the
Code clarifies a situation which is not covered by the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law. For example, what is the answer to
the following problem under the existing law? A payee
fraudulently induced a maker to issue a note, and the payee
negotiated the note to B who had in no way "participated"
in the fraud, although he took with notice of the fraud of
the payee. B then negotiated the instrument to H, a holder
in due course, who thereafter negotiated the note back to B.
100 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 49; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 79 states:
"Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value
without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the trans-
ferrer had therein, and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to have the
indorsement of the transferrer." (Italics added.) The NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
mENTS LAW § 49 speaks of "transferor," not "transferrer."
101 Regarding the necessity "for value" under the present law, see Moore v.
Moore, 35 Ga. App. 39, 131 S. E. 922 (1926). See cases in BRAiqNAN, NEG.-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 657 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
102 Nu0oTrABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 58; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 97.
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Does B under the Negotiable Instruments Law 103 acquire
the rights of H as a holder in due course? It is difficult in-
deed to say that B was a party to the fraud.10 4 The Code
has specifically resolved the problem by the addition of the
clause "... or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense
or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking
from a later holder in due course." 'LO Under the Code, B
does not succeed to the rights of the holder in due course.
B. Negotiation; Partial Assignment
The Code restates the existing law that an indorsement,
to be effective for negotiation, must convey the entire instru-
ment or any unpaid residue.1 6 Stemming from the premise
that the obligation on an instrument is single and entire, it
has been held that a transfer of part of the instrument is
ineffective to create a cause of action in the partial trans-
feree.10 7 However, the 'Code provides that if the indorsement
.. . purports to be of less it operates only as a partial
assignment." 108 Although such an indorsement under the
Code operates as a partial assignment of the cause of action,
it does not attempt to state the legal effect of such an assign-
ment. The effect of the partial or equitable assignment is a
matter of local law.109
C. Special Indorsement of Bearer Paper
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, "[w]here an in-
strument, payable to bearer, is indorsed specially, it may
nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery .... ,, 11 Con-
103 Ibid.
104 Berenson v. Conant, 214 Mass. 127, 101 N. E. 60 (1913). See Chafee,
The Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instriment by a Prior Party, 21 COL. L.
REv. 538 (1921).
10 5 UNIFORM CoMMa cLcL CODE § 3-201 (1) (Spring 1951) (italics added).
IOl Id. § 3-202(3).
107 Barkley v. Muller, 164 App. Div. 351, 149 N. Y. Supp. 620 (1st Dep't
1914).
108 UN FORM CoMnIA., CODE § 3-202(3) (Spring 1951).
109 See Offenstein v. Waggant, 89 Kan. 739, 132 Pac. 991 (1913); Dozier
v. Leary, 196 N. C. 12, 144 S. E. 368 (1928); Edgar v. Haines, 109 Ohio St.
159, 141 N. E. 837 (1923); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 156 (1932).
22o0 NEOTiABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 40; N. Y. NFa. INST. LAW § 70.
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siderable doubts have arisen as to the applicability of this
section to an instrument drawn payable to order but subse-
quently indorsed in blank, - thus becoming "bearer"
paper."' Some have sought to resolve the conflict by sug-
gesting that the instrument could be negotiated by delivery
alone, notwithstanding the special indorsement, only if the
instrument were initially bearer paper. 1 2 The Code not
only rejects the suggested solution, but also completely elim-
inates the pertinent provision of the Negotiable Instruments
Law." 3 Under the Code, the special indorsement controls
in all cases and the instrument may be further negotiated
only by the indorsement of the special indorsee.114
D. Restrictive Indorsements
The difficulties created by the Negotiable Instruments
Law in grouping in the same section as "restrictive indorse-
ments" 115 three substantially different types of indorsements
are well known. The problem is further complicated by
Section 47 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
which provides that "[a]n instrument negotiable in its origin
continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively in-
dorsed or discharged by payment or otherwise." The Code
has eliminated this provision, and has completely abandoned
the term "restrictive indorsements." It now properly class-
ifies these various indorsements into two separate sections.
Section 3-205, dealing with a conditional indorsement or
one prohibiting further transfer, states that "[n]either a
111 NwonrBrx INsTRumFNTs LAW § 9; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 28(5). See
Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
MicH. L. REv. 255, 274 (1950).
112 Ibid. See also Leary, Jr., Some Clarifications it the Law of Commercial
Paper Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 97 U. oF PA. L. REv.
354, 380-381 (1949); Cosway, Innovations in Articles Three and Four of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 284, 285 (1951).
113 NaEaoiAL INsTmiNTs LAW § 40; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 70.1 14 UNMIORM CoMMERcLA CoDE § 3-204(1) (Spring 1951). "Any instrument
specially indorsed becomes payable to the order of the special indorsee and may
be further negotiated only by his indorsement!'
:
1 1 5 NEn INsTRuMENTs LAW § 36; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 66. See
BRrToN, BuLS AND NoTEs 283 et seq. (1943); Taylor, Indorsenents for Col-
lection:-Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, [1950] WAsH. U. L. Q. 55.
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conditional indorsement nor one purporting to prohibit fur-
ther transfer of the instrument prevents its further transfer
or negotiation, and the transferee may enforce payment in
disregard of the limitation; but the indorsee and any other
subsequent transferee except a collecting or payor bank
takes the instrument or its proceeds subject to any rights of
the indorser." Hence, under the Code, an indorser has no
power to alter the negotiable character of the original obli-
gation, and the indorsement, "Pay to A only," would be
treated like any other conditional indorsement. Such in-
dorsement is to be construed as if it read "Pay A on condi-
tion that he does not transfer." 116
Section 3-206 provides:
When an indorsement, whether blank or special, states that it is
"for collection," "for deposit," or otherwise for the benefit or account
or use of the indorser or of another person
(a) the first taker under that indorsement must apply any value
given by him for or on the security of the instrument in the manner
and to the person or account directed by the indorsement;
(b) to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for value;
(c) later holders for value are not affected by the direction con-
tained in the indorsement unless they have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in breach of duty
(Section 3-304(2) (b)).
The inherent difficulty in drafting legislation dealing
with the foregoing indorsements is made evident by a com-
parison of Section 3-206 as it appeared in the spring 1950
draft of the Code with the spring 1951 provisions reproduced
above.
Under the present section, the indorsee under this type
of indorsement is bound to comply with the specific instruc-
tions contained in the indorsement. Subdivision (b), how-
ever, makes it clear that to the extent that such an indorsee
applies "any value" on the instrument "he becomes a holder
for value." Hence, even a collecting agent could be a "holder
for value" under such an indorsement if he advances money
116 UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 3-205, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
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and acquires a lien on the instrument without notice of any
defect. To this extent the Code will change the result of
decisions such as G-ulbranson-Dickinrson Co. v. Hopkins.117
Of course, the indorsee under any of the indorsements form-
erly denominated "restrictive" may now negotiate the instru-
ment further. He remains personally liable, however, for
any breach of the fiduciary relationship.
Subdivision (c) of Section 3-206 effects a major change
in the existing law 118 by freeing subsequent "holders for
value" 119 from the direction or instruction contained in the
indorsement "..... unless they have reasonable grounds to
believe that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in
breach of duty." Section 3-304(2) (b) declares that a pur-
chaser has notice of a claim "... when he has reasonable
grounds to believe that a fiduciary has negotiated the instru-
ment in payment of or as security for his own debt or in any
transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of
duty." It should be noticed, however, that knowledge that
any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary
does not, of itself, give a purchaser notice of a defense or
claim.12 0
VI. RIGHTS OF' A HOLDER
A. Holder in Due Cozrse
Section 3-302(1) of the Code describes the holder in due
course as a holder 121 who takes the instrument:
(a) for value; and
117 170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93 (1919) ; cf. Taylor, Indorsements for Col-
lectio :-Under the Negotiable Instumients Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, [1950] WASH. U. L. Q. 55, 72.
118 See Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N. Y. 223, 14 N. E. 2d 46 (1938) (indorse-
ment "for deposit" is restrictive in New York) ; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 350-c;
Mizell v. Hicks, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 158 (1938).
119 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-303 (Spring 1951) (Taking for Value).
1
2 0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304(5) (e) (Spring 1951).
2
21Id. § 1-201(20). "'Holder' means a person who is in possession of a
document of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or to bearer or in blank." Cf. NEGoIA INSTRUmENTS LAW§ 191; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 2. On the definitions of the Code, see Beutel,
The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem it; Codification, 16 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 141, 145 et seq. (1951). '
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(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable com-
mercial standards of any business in which the holder may be en-
gaged; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or
of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
1. Value. The Code separates the section on "value" 122
from that on "consideration." 123 Section 3-303, dealing with
value, leaves no doubt that the agreed consideration for the
instrument shall not constitute "value" unless the considera-
tion has been performed. Hence, an executory promise to
give value is not of itself "value." The usual illustration is
that of bank credit not drawn upon and which can be re-
voked or withdrawn when a claim or defense is asserted. 124
The other subdivisions of Section 3-303 restate generally ac-
cepted principles concerning the requirement of "value" for
due course holding.
2. Good faith. Since "good faith" under the Code
means "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned," 125 the language of Section 3-302(1) (b) indicates
that more than the "honesty in fact" standard is required for
due course holding. The provision envisages the formulation
of a standard of good faith possessing an objective test of
honesty and mercantile prudence. Pursuant to the Code
standard, a holder cannot claim to have taken an instrument
in "good faith" unless he has observed the reasonable com-
mercial standards of the business in which he is engaged.' 2 6
To this extent, the Code changes the "actual bad faith"
standard that is generally applied by the courts.127
122 UNIFORM Co , mciL. CODE § 3-303 (Spring 1951).
123 Id. §3-408. See Note, Consideration in Negotiable Instruments Law;
The Coinnercial Code Article III, Section 501, 57 YALE L. J. 1408 (1948).
124 Citizens' State Bank v. Cowles, 180 N. Y. 346, 73 N. E. 33 (1905). See
WHTEY, BiLLs AND NoTEs 89-90 (1948).
22 5 UNIFORM CommcIAL CODE § 1-201(19) (Spring 1951).
122The Negotiable Instruments Law states simply: "That he took it in
good faith and for value ... " NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52(3) ; N. Y.
Nan. INST. LAW § 91(3).
127 NEGoT.ABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 56; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 95 ("actual
knowledge" of infirmity or facts to constitute "bad faith"). See BIGELOW,
BILLs, NOrM AND CHEcxs 362 et seq. (1928). Cf. Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa.
549, 137 Atl. 113 (1927) (commercial bad faith),; Gerseta Corp. v. Wessex-
Campbell Silk Co., 3 F. 2d 236 "(2d Cir. 1924) ("commercially honest men").
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3. Overdue paper. In order to make it clear that the
purchaser of an instrument which is in fact overdue may,
nevertheless, be a holder in due course, the Code changes the
wording of the Negotiable Instruments Law from "1... that
he became the holder of it before it was overdue" 128 to
".... without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person." 129
4. Payee holder in due course. A serious conflict of
authority exists as to whether a payee may be a holder in
due course under the Negotiable Instruments Law. The
difficulty is primarily caused by subdivision four of Section
52 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law; 130 from its
language there has been drawn the inference that the instru-
ment must be "negotiated" to a holder in order to meet the
requirements of due course holding. Although Professor
Brannan has argued that such a construction does violence
to the Negotiable Instruments Law, many courts have held
that a payee cannot be a holder in due course.131 It is prob-
ably accurate to state that in New York a payee may be a
holder in due course if he meets the requirements of due
course holding.132 The Code eliminates the language of the
Negotiable Instruments Law that the instrument must be
See Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N. Y. 223, 233, 14 N. E. 2d 46, 50 (1938). "Even
if the actual good faith of the Federal Reserve Bank in dealing with the in-
strument is not questioned, if the facts shown by the instrument itself should
have led it to inquire, and by inquiry it would have discovered the true situa-
tion, in a commercial sense it acted in bad faith (italics supplied) and the law
will withhold from it such protection as it would otherwise have been entitled
to receive. .. .Failure to make this inquiry establishes, in a legal and com-
mercial sense, bad faith. . . ." The Soma case involved a restrictive indorse-
ment. See Rightmire, Doctrine of Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable III.
struments, 18 MicH. L. REV. 355 (1920).
128 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 52(2); N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 91(2).
129 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(1) Cc) (Spring 1951).13 0 NFmOTILALE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52(4); N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 91(4).
1 3 1 BRANNAN, NEanoWrAn INsTRUMENTs LAW 675 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel,
1948).
132 See Reif v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 268 N. Y. 269, 197 N. E.
278 (1935) ; Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Co., 171 App. Div. 776, 157 N. Y. Supp.
959 (1st Dep't 1916), appeal dismissed, 220 N. Y. 569, 115 N. E. 1033 (1917) ;
Brown v. Rowan, 91 Misc. 220, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1098 (N. Y. City Ct. 1915).
See discussion of Munn v. Boasberg, 292 N. Y. 5, 53 N. E. 2d 371 (1944), in
Note, Payee as a Holder in Due Course in New York, 2 SYAcusS L. REv. 119
(1950).
1951]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"negotiated" to a holder, and affirmatively declares: "A
payee may be a holder in due course." '.-
B. Notice to Purchaser
1. When instrument is "irregular." The Code section
on notice is quite lengthy and deals with some of the more
frequent and important problems that have come before the
courts on the question of notice. The requirement that an
instrument must be "complete and regular upon its face" 134
has been taken out of the Code section on holder in due course
and now appears in the section on "notice." 135 It provides
that the purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if "... the
instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of
forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call
into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an
ambiguity as to the party to pay." 136 The Code adds, how-
ever, that knowledge "that an incomplete instrument has
been completed" does not of itself give the purchaser notice
of a defense or claim, unless he has "notice of any improper
completion." 137
2. Notice that instrument is overdue. The Code pro-
vides that the purchaser has notice that an instrument is
overdue if he has reasonable grounds to believe:
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that
there is an uncured default in payment of another instrument of the
same series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has
been made or more than a reasonable length of time after its
issue .... 138
The Code provision restates the majority view that a
purchaser is not a holder in due course if he purchases with
133 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(2) (Spring 1951).
134 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52(1); N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 91(1).
135 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304 (Spring 1951).
16 Id. § 3-304(1) (a).
27 Id. § 3-304(5) (d).
13 8 Id. § 3-304(4).
[ VOL. 26
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
notice that an installment of principal is overdue.139 The
Code, however, would change the law of many jurisdictions
where the purchase of a note before it is overdue is not
deemed a bad faith purchase by reason of notice of default
in the payment of another note of the same series.140  The
innovation of the Code consists of the distinction between a
default and an uncured default. The inference is inescapable
that if the default in the payment of another instrument of
the same series has been cured, the purchaser may be a holder
in due course. The Code codifies the majority rule that no-
tice of a default in the payment of interest is insufficient to
give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim.' 41
Although the Code makes no general pronouncement on
"reasonable length of time," and hence leaves unchanged the
decisions that have applied the Negotiable Instruments Law
provision,142 concerning domestic checks, it establishes the
presumption that they are overdue after 30 days.1 43
3. When notice effective. The section on notice ex-
pressly provides that, in order for the notice of a claim or
defense to be effective, the notice "... must be received at
such time and in such manner as to give reasonable oppor-
tunity to act on it.' 44 For example, notice to a bank man-
ager would not be effective to prevent the bank from being a
holder in due course if a moment thereafter the bank's teller
cashed a check before the manager had reasonable time to
notify the tellers.
4. Is standard of notice subjective or objective? Under
the existing law, it is generally agreed that the standard for
due course holding is simply that of "good faith." The test
is said to be a subjective one, meaning simply the absence of
239 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Talbott, 39 Idaho 707, 230 Pac. 30(1924); Hibbard v. Collins, 127 Me. 383, 143 Ati. 600 (1928).194 Morgan v. Farmington Coal and Coke Co., 97 W. Va. 83, 124 S. E. 591(1924).
"41 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304(5) (f) (Spring 1951).
142 NEG6TIABL INSTRUMENTS LAv §§ 193, 53; N. Y. NEa. INST. LAW §§ 4,
92. Commercial Nat. Bank of Syracuse v. Zimmerman, 185 N. Y. 210, 77
N. E. 1020 (1906); In re Taylor's Estate, 174 Misc. 457, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 245(Surr. Ct. 1940).
143 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304(4) (c) (Spring 1951).
144Id. § 3-304(7).
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actual bad faith,145 and not the objective standard of "due
care." The Code states that "good faith" means honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 146 For due
course holding, however, it adds the necessity for the ".
observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any
business in which the holder may be engaged." 147 This must
be read together with the definition of "notice" applicable to
a purchaser or holder, which is stated to mean that "from all
the facts and circumstances known to him at the time of pur-
chase or taking he had reason to know." 148
Although it is probably intended by the framers that the
court is to inquire as to whether a particular commercial
standard is reasonable, 149 the definitions in the Code will still
raise questions of fact for a jury.
The above definitions, together with the language of
Section 3-304, that a purchaser has notice of a claim "when
he has reasonable grounds to believe," would seem to indicate
that the Code seeks to establish an objective standard rather
than a subjective test of honesty. One thing is clear. The
Code provisions differ from the existing legislation 150 and
may therefore have the effect of introducing a commercially
reasonably prudent man test into the law of negotiable in-
struments. 151 By virtue of the retrogression evidenced by the
Code in the segregation of merchants from non-merchants, 152
the observations made concerning the objective standard of
commercial honesty are limited to the professional business-
145 See Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
48 MICH. L. REv. 255, 280 (1950). See note 127 mtpra.
146 UN FORM CoMMECa.L CODE § 1-201(19) (Spring 1951).
1471d. § 3-302 (1) (b).
I- Id. § 1-201(25).
14 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201, Comment 18 (Spring 1950). The
definition was changed in the 1951 draft. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§3-302(1) (b) (Spring 1951).
150 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LANW § 56; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 95.
15 See Gerseta Corp. v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., 3 F. 2d 236, 238 (2d Cir.
1924). See also Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Queens County Trust Co., 226
N. Y. 225, 123 N. E. 370 (1919). Some courts have already used the com-
mercially honest man test as enunciated in the Gerseta Corp. case. See note
127 supra.
152 For example, Article Two on Sales has a separate definition for "good
faith" in the case of merchants. For the merchant "good faith" includes
"observance of reasonable commercial standards." UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-104 (Spring 1951). See also §§2-104(3), 2-103(8).
[ VoL. 26
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
man. For the non-professional, the test of honesty in fact
will probably continue to prevail.
0. Rights of Holder in Due Course
Section 3-305, dealing with the rights of a holder in due
course, enumerates and codifies the generally accepted "real"
defenses assertable against a holder in due course. The sec-
tion states:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple con-
tract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to ob-
tain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when
he takes the instrument.
The Code substitutes "all claims to it on the part of any
person" for the language "any defect of title of prior parties"
of the present Negotiable Instruments Law 153 to make it
clear that the holder in due course takes the instrument free
of not only any claim of title, but also of all liens, equities
or other claims of any kind whatever. "All defenses" in-
cludes non-delivery or delivery for a special purpose.15 4 The
foregoing defenses may, however, be asserted against one not
a holder in due course.1 55 Hence, the defense of nondelivery
1 53 NEOTiABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 57; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 96.
154 See notes 94, 96 supra.
,' 
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-306 (Spring 1951).
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of an incomplete instrument would no longer be available
against a holder in due course.156
Subdivision (b) recognizes duress in the factum or in
the execution, 157 and defenses that may arise under gambling
or usury statutes. 58  Subdivision (c) codifies the rule fol-
lowed by those well-reasoned cases which have recognized
fraud in the execution as a real defense assertable against a
holder in due course.'59 The test under the Code is that the
party was fraudulently induced to sign the instrument with
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge of its character or its essential terms. It is to be
noticed that the defense would also be available to one who
signed knowing that he signed a negotiable instrument, pro-
vided he had no knowledge of its essential terms. Hence, it
is not limited to the cases of surreptitious substitution or the
signing of an autograph or other signature specimen. The
test is one of "excusable ignorance." 160 Ignorance alone is
not enough. The party asserting the defense must show that
there was no reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge.
The comments to the Code make it perfectly clear that in
determining this factual question all factors must be taken
into account.161
D. Rights of One Not a Holder in Due Course
1. Personal defenses. Unless a person has the rights
of a holder in due course, all valid claims and defenses which
would be available in an action on a simple contract, includ-
ing want or failure of consideration, nonperformance of any
156 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 15; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 34.
57 See Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 13 N. E. 596 (1887); WHITNEY,
BILLS AND NOTES 117 (1948); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §494, illustration 2
(1932). See also Loomis v. Ruck, 56 N. Y. 462 (1874).
158 N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 370, 371, 373; N. Y. PINAL LAW §§ 992, 993;
Sabine v. Paine, 223 N. Y. 401, 119 N. E. 849 (1918); Claflin v. Boorum, 122
N. Y. -385, 25 N. E. 360 (1890).159 BIGELOw, BILLs, NoTEs AND CHECKS 403 et seq. (1928); OGDEN, NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS 344 et seq. (1947). "The Negotiable Instruments Law
has no provision as to fraud in factum. Such fraud was a real defense at
common law and is perhaps a real defense by the weight of present authority."
Id. at 346.
160 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305, Comment 7 (Spring 1950).
161 Ibid. See Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194 (1871).
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condition precedent, nondelivery or delivery for a special
purpose, may be asserted against him in an action on a nego-
tiable instrument. These matters, although firmly estab-
lished under the Negotiable Instruments Law,16 2 are happily
combined into one section in the Uniform Commercial
Code. 163
2. Jus tertii. At common law, considerable confusion
existed in the law concerning the right of a party, who had
no defense of his own, to set up as a defense an outstanding
equity of ownership or other right of restitution of a third
party who was not a party to the litigation. It seems to have
been the weight of authority, both at common law and under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, that a party to a negotiable
instrument, when sued thereon, could not establish, in de-
fense of the action, an equity of ownership or right of resti-
tution in a third party who was not a party to the action. 6 4
Furthermore, such party could not successfully defend by
showing that the plaintiff acquired title in an illegal trans-
action.6 5  However, this latter view probably does not rep-
resent the New York view under the Negotiable Instruments
Law and New York Penal Law.166 One New York court held
that the provisions of the Penal Law declaring that gambling
contracts "shall be utterly void" renders the indorsement
void, and hence whatever interest in the instrument passed
to the plaintiff was insufficient to permit him to sue there-
on.
167
162 NEGOIABLE INSTRUxENTS LAW §§ 28, 58; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW §§ 54,
98.
163 UNIFoRM COMMERu CIAL CODE § 3-306 (Spring 1951).
164 See Bowles v. Oakman, 246 Mich. 674, 225 N. W. 613 (1929); Baird v.
Lorenz, 57 N. D. 804, 224 N. W. 206 (1929); Brown v. Penfield, 36 N. Y.
473 (1867); Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549, 137 Atl. 113 (1927) ; cf. Hays v.
Hathorn, 74 N. Y. 486 (1878). See also BRiTroN, BILs AND NoTEs 759 et
seq. (1943).
165 Rumping v. Arkansas Nat. Bank, 121 Ark. 202, 180 S. W. 749 (1915);
Gould v. Leavitt, 92 Me. 416, 43 Atl. 17 (1899); Reed v. Bond, 96 Mich. 134,
55 N. W. 619 (1893) ; Berstein v. Fuerth, 132 Misc. 343, 229 N. Y. Supp. 791
(N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1928).
166 N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 991-993; see Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 244 App.
Div. 590, 280 N. Y. Supp. 474 (3d Dep't 1935); Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N. Y.
486 (1878).
'
67 Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 244 App. Div. 590, 280 N. Y. Supp. 474 (3d
Dep't 1935). "If defendant's [drawer of checks] version of the facts is true,
[that plaintiff acquired checks in gambling transaction with the payee, Dicks]
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In the case of a plaintiff who acquired the instrument by
theft, neither at common law nor under the Negotiable In-
struments Law, would the courts permit such a recovery.10 8
In such cases, the courts have permitted the defendant to
assert the jus tertii of the third party from whom the in-
strument had been stolen. Of course, if the plaintiff is a
holder in due course of bearer paper stolen by a thief, under
the Negotiable Instruments Law he would hold the instru-
ment "free from any defect of title of prior parties," 169 and
under the Code would take free from "all claims to it on the
part of any person." 170
The unsettled jus tertii problems discussed above are re-
solved as follows by the Code:
Unless a person has the rights of a holder in due course, he takes
the instrument subject to:
- . the defense that the plaintiff or a person through whom he
holds the instrument acquired it by theft. The claim of any third
person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to
any party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the
action for such party.171
If this latter provision were to prevail over the strong
public policy announced in the applicable sections of the
Penal Law, it would effect a change in the New York law in-
sofar as it would categorically eliminate jus tertii as a de-
fense unless the third party himself chooses to become a
litigant and defend the action.
The one exception to the above policy as enunciated in
the Code is found in the case of a theft of the instrument.
In such case, the thief will not be aided directly or indirectly.
Hence, even the transferee from the thief will not prevail un-
less he has the rights of a holder in due course.
the transactions between plaintiff and Dicks were unlawful, and the attempt
to pass title thereby was a nullity."
188 Bairrow, BILs AND NoEs 765 (1943) ; Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper,
31 HAnv. L. REv. 1104, 1112-1119 (1918).
269 NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS LAW § 57; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 96.




E. Matters of Evidence and Pleading
The Code provides that unless a signature is specifi-cally
denied in the pleadings it is deemed admitted.172 This pro-
vision would change the New York law and would make a
general denial ineffective to raise the issue of the genuine-
ness of a signature. The specific denial may be on informa-
tion and belief or it may be a denial of knowledge or infor-
mation sufficient to form a belief. 137
When a signature is put in issue, the "burden of estab-
lishing" 174 it is on the party claiming under the signature.1 5
However, the Code establishes the "presumption" 176 that a
signature is genuine or authorized "1... except where the ac-
tion is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who
has died or become incompetent before proof is required." 177
Once signatures are admitted or proven, a holder makes out
his case simply by the production of the instrument, and
must recover in the absence of any defense. The defendant
has the burden of establishing all defenses by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
Further innovations effected by the Code may be sum-
marized as follows:
At the trial of a cause on a negotiable instrument, the
issue as to whether a holder is a holder in due course does
not arise until evidence of a defense has been introduced. If
the defendant introduces evidence of a defense, the plaintiff
may elect to "cut off" the defense by establishing either that
he is a holder in due course or that he has acquired the rights
of a prior holder in due course.178 On this issue the holder
has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence
172Id. §3-307(1).
173 See PRASHKxER, Naw YORK PRACTICE § 171 (2d ed. 1951).
74 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(8) (Spring 1951). ("... means
the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is
more probable than its non-existence.")
3.5 Id. § 3-307(1) (a).
176 Id. § 1-201(31). ("'Presumption' or 'presumed' means that the trier of
fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is
introduced which would support a finding of its non-existence.")
177 Id. § 3-307(1) (b).
3.7 Id. § 3-201(1).
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on all of the essential elements of due course holding1 79 Of
course, as a matter of trial practice, the plaintiff may elect
not to introduce evidence regarding his status as a holder in
due course and may stand or fall on the issue of the defense.
If the evidence is not such as to justify the direction of a
verdict, the issue of the defense will go to the jury. There-
fore, a holder who might have difficulty establishing his due
course holding is likely to concentrate on disproving the de-
fendant's defense. Obviously, the plaintiff will lose in any
event if the defendant succeeds in establishing a "real" de-
fense.18 0
VII. LIABILITY OF PARTIES
A. Signature
Although nothing in the Code is intended to prevent any
liability that may arise apart from the instrument, the Code
retains the language of the Negotiable Instruments Law that
"[n]o person is liable on an instrument unless his signature
appears thereon." 181 The Code eliminates the two exceptions
to the above provisions that were found in the Negotiable
Instruments Law, viz., acceptance by separate instrument,'
and a promise to accept.' 83
Regarding signatures, the Code restates the existing law
that "[a] signature is made by use of any name, including
any trade or assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any
word or mark used in lieu of a written signature." 184 No-
where does the Code require that an instrument be "sub-
scribed."
Regarding a signature in an ambiguous capacity, the
Code codifies the existing law that "[u]nless the instrument
79 Id. § 3-302; see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307, Comment 3 (Spring
1950); Kelso v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364 (1918).
18 0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 (2) (Spring 1951).
'81 Id. § 3-401(1); NEGOIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 18; N. Y. NEG. INstr.
LAW § 37.18 2 NEOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 134; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 222.
33 In view of the commercial fact that the "virtual" and "collateral" accep-
tances are now almost entirely obsolete, they were properly omitted from the
Code. See Report of the Committee an the Proposed Commercial Code, Sec-
tion of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS 205, 209
(1950) ; 6 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 123 (May 1951).
184 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-401(2) (Spring 1951).
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clearly indicates that a signature is made in some other
capacity it is an indorsement." 185
B. Signature by Authorized Representative
The Code eliminates the Negotiable Instruments Law
section dealing with signature "by procuration." 186 The
latter provision had been based upon the English practice
which put a third party on notice that the agent was acting
under a power of attorney. This meaning of the expression
"per procuration" was almost unknown in the United States
where it has meant simply that the signer was acting as
agent.
Under a minority New York rule, where an authorized
agent orally discloses his principal and signs "Albert An-
drews, agent," in order to escape personal liability, in an
action by one not a holder in due course, the agent may
show by parol that he had orally disclosed the name of his
principal.18 7 Under the Code, the New York rule would be
changed and would be made to conform with the generally
accepted standard of liability of an agent who signs nego-
tiable paper. The Code provides:
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to
an instrument is also personally obligated unless the instrument names
the person represented and shows that the signature is made in a
representative capacity. The name of an organization preceded or
followed by the name and office of an authorized individual is a sig-
nature made in a representative capacity.' 8 8
Whereas in New York, in an action by one not a holder
in due course, although "agent" or a similar word is now
sufficient to permit the agent to introduce evidence that he
in fact orally disclosed the name of the priiicipal, under the
IssId. § 3-402 (italics added); NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTs LAw § 17(6);
N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 36(6).188 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 21; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 40.
'MS7Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N. Y. 1, 65 N. E. 738 (1902); WHITNEY,
BIuLS AND NoTs 19 (1948). In Azzarellow v. Richards, 198 Misc. 723, 99
N. Y. S. 2d 597 (Syracuse Munic. Ct. 1950), the court pushed the Megowan
decision beyond reasonable bounds and permitted the agent to escape liability
even though no words of agency appeared on the check.188 UNIORM COmmERCiAL CODE § 3-403(2) (Spring 1951) (italics added).
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Code the word "agent," without disclosing the principal on
the instrument, would be insufficient. No distinction is made
between a plaintiff who is a holder in due course and an ac-
tion by any other party.18 9
C. Unauthorized Signatures
The Code states the generally accepted rule that an un-
authorized signature, like a forgery, is wholly inoperative
unless adopted or ratified. It is effective solely to impose
liability on the actual signer who is not liable in damages
for breach of warranty of authority, but on the instrument
in the capacity in which he signed.190
D. Fictitious Payees and Impostors
1. Fictitious payees. Under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, an instrument is payable to bearer "[w]hen it is
payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and
such fact was known to the person making it so payable." '91
The Code has reworded the above section and has included
much-needed provisions to cope with the "impostor" cases.19 2
Section 3-405 of the Code provides that an indorsement
by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if:
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced
the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confed-
erate in the name of the payee;
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument;
(c) an agent or employee of the drawer has supplied him with
the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
28 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-403, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
I"o UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 3-404 (Spring 1951) ; NEaorABLE INSTRU-
mENTS LAw § 23; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAw § 42.
91 NEGOmABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 9(3) ; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 28(3).
T92 See Halsey v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 134, 139, 200
N. E. 671, 673 (1936) ; Strang v. Westchester County Nat. Bank, 235 N. Y.
68, 72, 138 N. E. 739, 741 (1923); cf. Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Silverman, 148
App. Div. 1, 6-7, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1017, 1020-1021 (lst Dep't 1911), aff'd, 210
N. Y. 567, 104 N. E. 1134 (1914).
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The result of the Code provisions is to give effect to an
indorsement made in the name of the payee by any of the
persons specified in the section and thereby to protect a
holder in due course or a good faith payor. This is accom-
plished by treating the indorsement as a valid negotiation,
and not by treating the paper as "bearer" paper. This, of
course, changes the existing law, because under the Code
approach, subsequent indorsements are not dispensed with
if necessary for negotiation.
2. Impostors. In cases where an impostor induces a
maker of a note or a drawer of a check to issue an instru-
ment payable to the impostor in the name of an existing or
non-existing person, it is the policy of the Code that the in-
strument is in fact payable to the impostor under an assumed
name. Hence, he may effectively indorse in that name.
The courts have tried to solve the various impostor cases
by ascertaining the "dominant" intent of the drawer. In
face to face transactions, generally, the dominant intent has
been said to be to name the person, while in dealing by mail
the dominant intent has been held to be to deal with the
name rather than with the person. 193
The Code rejects the distinction as being unreal inas-
much as the two intentions cannot be separated, since the
maker or drawer really intends the two to be the one and
the same person. Hence, the indorsement of the impostor is
effective whether the transaction has been face to face or
through the mails. This would change the result of a deci-
sion such as Mercantile National Bank v. Silverman.194
Again, by the application of an equitable principle the loss is
made to fall on the maker or drawer and not upon the holder
in due course or good faith payor. 195 The Code section prop-
erly adds that nothing in the impostor section affects the
criminal or civil liability of the person so indorsing.1' 6
193 Ibid.
194 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd, 210 N. Y.
567, 104 N. E. 1134 (1914). See discussion in BimroN, BILLS AND NOTES
691, 711 (1943).
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(1) (Spring 1951).
196 Id. §3-405(2).
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E. Alteration: Negligence Contributing to Alteration or
Unauthorized Signature
It is the law of New York that the maker of a note is
not bound to draw the note in such a manner as to prevent
a material alteration of the instrument. Hence, even if the
instrument was so drawn as to have facilitated a material
alteration, the holder in due course can only recover accord-
ing to the original tenor.197 However, if a depositor draws
a check in such manner as to facilitate alteration, he will be
denied recovery in an action against the drawee bank for
funds debited on his account. This distinction is predicated
on the basis of a duty of care owing from the depositor to
the drawee-bank. 198
The distinction found in the New York decisions is
abolished by the Code. The Code adopts the reasoning of
Young v. Grote,199 which held that a drawer of an instrument
so negligently drawn as to facilitate its material alteration is
liable to the drawee who pays the altered instrument in good
faith.
Under the rules governing material alteration, 00 the
holder in due course may enforce the altered instrument ac-
cording to its original tenor. However, where the negligence
of the maker or drawer "substantially contributes" to the
alteration, or the making of an unauthorized signature, the
Code provides that such person is "... precluded from assert-
ing the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in due
course or a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument
in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commer-
cial standards of the drawee's or payor's business." 201 This
197 National Exchange Bank v. Lester, 194 N. Y. 461, 87 N. E. 779 (1909);
NEGOI-ABLE INSTRumENTS LAW § 124; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 205.
,198 Timbel v. Garfield Nat. Bank, 121 App. Div. 870, 106 N. Y. Supp. 497
(1st Dep't 1907) (Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (1827)
approved); Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969 (1902).
See also Trust Co. of America v. Conklin, 65 Misc. 1, 119 N. Y. Supp. 367
(Sup. Ct. 1909); Note, Dities and Liabilities Arising fron Bank-Depositor
Relationslp, 25 ST. Jo iN's L. REv. 73 (1950).
1994 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (1827).
200 UNIFORM CommERClAL CODE § 3-407 (Spring 1951) ; NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW § 124; N. Y. NEG. IN ST. LAW § 205.
201 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406 (Spring 1951).
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section will overturn the reasoning of the Lester case,20 2 and
would apply the special protection now afforded only to
banks to all holders in due course or good faith payors.
The Code section also applies to negligence which "sub-
stantially contributes" to a forgery or other unauthorized
signature, as in the case where a drawer who makes use of
a signature stamp is negligent in guarding such stamp, and
to negligence contributing to a forgery of the signature of
another, as in a case where a check is negligently mailed to
the wrong person having the same name as the payee.20 3
F. Acceptance
1. Generally. The Code eliminates the sections of the
Negotiable Instruments Law dealing with acceptance for
honor 20 4 and the sections dealing with acceptance by sep-
arate instrument 205 and the promise to accept.206
2. Acceptor's liability on altered draft. In New York,
as in the majority of states, where a draft has been altered
before acceptance, and the drawee accepts the draft in its
altered form without knowledge that it had been altered, the
acceptor is not held liable on the instrument as altered. The
acceptor or certifying bank is liable only according to the
original tenor, and, if payment is made before discovery of
the alteration, such payor can recover the surplus from any
holder to whom payment was made.20 7 If the alteration con-
sisted in the substitution of a new payee for the original
payee, the drawee bank can recover the amount so paid from
a bona fide holder for value.208  In Illinois and California,
202 See note 197 supra.2 03 UNIFORM CommERcIAL CODE § 3-406, Comment 7 (Spring 1950). See
Keck v. Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234 S. W. 2d 183 (1950).2 0 4 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 161-170; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW §§ 280-
289.2 05 NEOnABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 134; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 222.20 8 NEGOTABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 135; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAV § 223.
207 White v. Continental National Bank, 64 N. Y. 316 (1876) ; National Bank
of Commerce v. National Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 55 N. Y. 211 (1873);
National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exchange Bank, 171 App. Div. 195, 157 N. Y.
Supp. 316 (1st Dep't 1916).
20S Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260
(1919).
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under the Negotiable Instruments Law, the courts held that
the certifying bank could not recover from the holder to
whom it made payment on an altered check.2 0 9
In cases involving a holder in due course, the Code re-
jects the New York view, and adopts the Illinois and Cali-
fornia view, upon the reasoning that the acceptance is an
undertaking relied upon in good faith by an innocent
party.210 Furthermore, the attempt to avoid the above re-
sponsibility by certifying checks or by accepting drafts
"payable as originally drawn" is ineffective to defeat the
rights of a subsequent holder in due course.211 It should be
noticed, however, that, under the Code, a person obtaining an
acceptance warrants that the instrument has not been altered
before acceptance. Hence, the Code continues the rule which
permits a party paying a materially altered instrument in
good faith to recover, and a party who accepts such instru-
ment to avoid his acceptance. The exception which changes
the New York rule applies only to a holder in due course who
has taken the instrument subsequent to the alteration. 212
3. Certification of a check. Under the Negotiable In-
struments Law, where the holder of a check procures it to
be accepted or certified, the drawer and all indorsers are dis-
charged from liability.21 3 The negative implication is clear
from the language of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and
the courts have held that the certification of a check at the
request of the drawer does not operate to discharge either the
drawer or the indorsers. 214
Whereas the 1950 draft of the Code removed the nega-
tive implication by providing that certification discharged
209 Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156,
4 P. 2d 781 (1931) ; National Bank of Chicago v. National Bank, 300 Ill. 103,
132 N. E. 832 (1921).
210 UNIFORM COMMERC L CODE § 3-417 (Spring 1951) (Warranties on Pre-
sentment and Transfer).
211 Id. § 3-417(b).
2=. Ibid.
21s NEGOTILE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 189; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 324.
2 14 Gallo v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 199 N. Y. 222, 92 N. E. 633 (1910);
Davenport v. Palmer, 152 App. Div. 761, 131 N. Y. Supp. 764 (2d Dep't 1912),
rez'd on other grounds, 211 N. Y. 596, 105 N. E. 800 (1914). See also Sutter
v. Security Trust Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 44, 122 Atl. 381 (1923), affd, 96 N. J. Eq.
644, 126 Atl. 435 (1924).
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all prior liability on a check (except that of a drawer who
had also indorsed), the 1951 draft reverts to the existing law
and provides that "[w]here a holder procures certification
the drawer and all prior indorsers are discharged." 21r The
Code also codifies existing law by providing that "[u]nless
otherwise agreed a bank has no obligation to certify a
check." 216
4. "Qualified" acceptance. The Code eliminates the
terminology "qualified" acceptance and substitutes the
phrase, "Acceptance Varying Draft." It provides:
(1) Where the drawee's proffered acceptance in any manner
varies the draft as presented the holder may refuse the acceptance
and treat the draft as dishonored in which case the drawee is entitled
to have his acceptance cancelled.
(2) Where the holder assents to such an acceptance each drawer
and indorser who does not affirmatively assent is discharged except
where the variance is that payment shall be made only at a particular
place. 217
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,218 when a
drawer or indorser received notice of a "qualified" accept-
ance, within a reasonable time he had to express his dissent
to the holder or he would have been deemed to have assented
thereto. This is changed by the provision of the Code pur-
suant to which, if a drawer or indorser does not affirmatively
assent to the acceptance which varies the draft, he will be
discharged.219
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A. Presentment, Notice of Dishonor and Protest
The Code 220 eliminates the requirement of protest ex-
cept upon dishonor of a draft which on its face appears to be
drawn or payable outside of the United States. Concerning
21
s UNIFORM COmmERCAL CODE § 3-411(1) (Spring 1951) (italics added).
21 Id. § 3-411(2). Watchel v. Rosen, 249 N. Y. 386, 164 N. E. 326 (1928).
217 Id. § 3-412.
s NEGoTLE INsTR U FNTS LAW § 142; N. Y. NFG. I sT. LAW § 230.
219 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-412(2) (Spring 1951).
220 Id. § 3-501 (3). See when protest is excused. Id. § 3-511.
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presentment, it eliminates the technical requirement of ex-
hibition of the instrument 22 1 and provides that presentment
is sufficient if made by mail or through a clearing house. 2
Whereas the 1950 draft of the Code sought to effect a
revolutionary change by the elimination of the requirement
of presentment and notice of dishonor in order to charge the
indorser of a note, the 1951 draft retains both requirements,
unless excused, in order to charge any indorser.2 2 3
B. Discharge
The Negotiable Instruments Law speaks of the discharge
of a negotiable instrument.2 2 4 Since this created uncertain-
ties concerning the rights of a subsequent holder in due
course, the language of the Negotiable Instruments Law is
eliminated and the Code distinguishes between the discharge
of a single party and the discharge of all parties.225 The
Code expressly provides that "[n]o discharge of any party
provided by this Article is effective against a subsequent
holder in due course unless he has notice thereof when he
takes the instrument." 226
The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that "[p]ay-
ment is made in due course when it is made at or after the
maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof in good faith
and without notice that his title is defective." 227 This ap-
proach is entirely changed by the Code which substitutes a
new provision entitled "Payment or Satisfaction." It pro-
vides:
(1) The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his
payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with
knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument unless prior
to such payment or satisfaction the person making the claim either
supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the dis-
22 1 NEOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS LAW § 142; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 230.
222 UNIFORM CO2,niERcL, CODE § 3-504(2) (a) (Spring 1951). These sub-
sections are to be rearranged. See June 1951 Revision, Page 7.
223 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-501(1) (b), 3-501(2) (a) (Spring 1951).
2 24 NEmonABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 119; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAw § 200.
225 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-601 (Spring 1951).
2261d. § 3-602.
2 27 NEGOrIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 88; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 148.
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charge or enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction in an action in which the adverse claimant and the
holder are parties. 228
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The far-reaching effects and ramifications of a codifica-
tion which has been accurately referred to as "of the greatest
importance in the history of American law" 229 cannot be
completely discussed or even presented in a single article or
symposium.
Surely an article on the law of negotiable instruments
could have profitably treated sections such as 3-702, dealing
with the effect of a negotiable instrument on the obligation
for which it was given, Section 3-703, dealing with the tech-
nique of vouching in a third party 23 0 who is or may be liable
on the instrument, Section 3-704, dealing with lost, destroyed
or stolen instruments,231 and many other important and in-
teresting sections. Nevertheless, in this article an effort has
been made to present some of the more important changes
and codifications that would be effected by the adoption of
the Code. Not only does the Code resolve existing doubts
and conflicts of authority, but also makes a major contribu-
tion by legislating in many fields where the present statute
law is silent.23 2
228 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-603(1) (Spring 1951).
29 Franklin, On, the Legal Method of the Uniform Conmwrcial Code, 16 LAw
& CoNTEmP. PROB. 330 (1951).
230 See N. Y. Civ. PR~c. AcT § 193.
231 See id. § 333.
232 See Emblidge, Commercial Paper Under the Proposed Uniform Code.
23 N. Y. STATE BAR Bul.. 371, 373 (1951) ; Report, Corporation, Banking and
Business Law Section (A.B.A.) on the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
Sept. 1951; Scbnader, The New Commercial Code: Moderniaing Our Uniform
Commercial Acts, 36 A. B. A. J. 179 (1950).
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